As the November 28/29, 2013 European Union’s Eastern Partnership Summit in Lithuania draws closer, expectations that Ukraine will sign an association agreement with the EU are increasing, tensions have escalated between Moscow and Ukraine, and also between Kiev and Brussels. These growing conflicts should not be seen in terms of Aesopian fables about Russia’s pursuit of the USSR’s restoration or Ukraine’s alleged European roots and destiny.
Despite claims made in the West and by the Ukrainian opposition, Viktor Yanukovich has not proven to be Moscow’s puppet. He signed Ukraine’s 2010 law ‘On the Basic Directions of Domestic and Foreign Policy’ which stipulates Ukraine’s integration “into the European political, economic and legal area for the purpose of becoming a member of the European Union.” Nor is he willing to alienate Moscow and half of his country’s populace by severing Ukraine’s deeply rooted ties to Russia. This dispute is much more about Ukraine’s balanced strategic development and power-maximizing among the contending parties.
The conflict between Russia and the EU over Ukraine’s future is based on perceived self-interest and power-maximizing; something in which all states and unions of states engage. One way states maximize their power (sometimes with unintended costly trade-offs, to be sure) is to join in various economic, political and/or military associations, alliances, unions, etc. Some states are powerful initiators and dominant players in such unions; others are latecomers joining out of weakness.
The formation of international organizations, regimes and unions is further driven by globalization’s imperative for integration among states (coupled with some disintegration within states), including now hundreds of international organizations, as one modality for power maximizing. Within the globe’s network of networks, unions of states - like individual states - seek to maximize their influence and power, by increasing the number of their members.
Thus, Ukraine seeks to increase its economic (and even political) potential by joining such unions. By joining the EU Kiev seeks markets for its products, technological development for its industries, and a role in one of the major economic, political and, one suspects, military blocs. NATO is a likely destiny after Kiev chooses the EU.
Since Russia’s strategic and political cultures value its historical great power status, Moscow is especially keen to maximize power by creating unions around its cultural, economic, political, and military potential. Specifically, it seeks to maintain its status as the main power in Central Eurasia by constructing a series of economic unions and military alliances: the Eurasian Customs Union (with Kazakhstan, Belarus, and now Armenia), the United Economic Space (Customs Union plus several Central Asian states), the Eurasian Economic Union project, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (with China’s membership containing Moscow’s ambitions, in this case).
The membership of Ukraine, the second most powerful of the former Soviet republics, would significantly enhance the clout of these Eurasian projects, thereby increasing Russia’s own economic and political power. Conversely, Ukraine’s rejection of these Eurasian unions weakens the attractiveness of these projects to other prospective members, confining them largely to Russia and the weakest post-Soviet economies. This less than robust configuration barely enhances Russia’s power in the region and in the end may prove more of a burden than a boost. Moscow’s recent inter-ethnic difficulties from legal and illegal immigration flowing from allied Central Asian states and Azerbaijan demonstrates this. One solution to combat high rates of illegal, low-skilled immigration from these countries’ would be to introduce a visa regime for them. However, Moscow’s desire to maintain a connection to these states and its own status as an attraction for their populations, dictate against instituting such a regime.
Europe also seeks to bolster its power by bringing in Eastern Europe’s largest country. Beyond increasing the common market’s economic power, Ukraine’s inclusion will promote Europe’s energy security, assuming that Ukraine’s bargaining power vis-à-vis Moscow is indeed bolstered sufficiently to preclude a gas cut off to Europe.
But a happy ending for all is not guaranteed. For Kiev, a European choice will not be all roses. There is no guarantee that Ukraine’s present leadership is capable of overcoming powerful domestic clans, corruption, and other obstacles to the domestic legal, economic and political reforms that accession to the EU requires. Ukraine’s failure to accede would drive it into Russia’s arms and foster the kind of resentment of Europe that Turkey experienced after Europe spurned its entry into the EU.
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(the title is a pun)
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