China and America Have Very Different Views of What Deterence Means

In Western strategic thought, deterrence is defined as “the threat intended to keep an adversary from doing something.” Within the framework of the NSSS, the objective is to “…deter the development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S. national security.” The Department of Defense believes that the best way to “deny a potential aggressor” is through creating interdependence within its vital space architectures through international agreements and operational tactics, techniques, and procedures. Through this, in their view, it would “deny a potential aggressor the opportunity to fight on-on-one. Instead, the aggressor must attack assets and forces of multiple countries, which expands the scope of a conflict and reduces the odds that a potential aggressor can achieve their desired outcome at an acceptable cost.”17 This concept appears to have been crafted in a strategic and cultural analysis vacuum, given the unimpeded Chinese activity in space weapons research and testing, and its very different view toward deterrence. What we as a nation or coalition perceive as an “acceptable cost” and what the Chinese perceive as deterrence and acceptable cost, given the contemporary history and objectives of the CCP and PLA, are two very different things.

The PLA defines the strategy of deterrence (weishe zhanlue) as “the display of military power, or the threat of use of military power, in order to compel an opponent to submit.” In other words, as Henry Kissinger states, China’s view of deterrence “is similar to the Western concept of preemption—anticipating an attack by launching the first blow.” While the Chinese view does have some pre-emptive characteristics, its use in history appears to relate more to coercion or compellence than pure deterrence in the Western sense. Coercion is defined as “causing someone to choose one course of action over another by making the choice that the coercer prefers appear more attractive than the alternative.” An example of this in conventional conflict would be during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. The PLA invaded India, conducted military operations, and then re-deployed back to their border positions. The goal was to coerce or compel the Indians to not push China into full-scale war and place Beijing into a better negotiating position.21 The way to accomplish this is to demonstrate that the PLA was not weak and ready to conduct those operations if needed. They had achieved what is known as escalation dominance. Having the ability to achieve a “psychological shock” enabled China to deter through force, their enemies by demonstrating their ability to fight and emerge victorious. (Mao’s motivating force, according to Kissinger, was “less to inflict a decisive military first blow than to change the psychological balance.” Having a psychological shock to their enemy, achieved the goal of “genuine deterrence.”)

This view is clearly seen in the PLA’s current definition of deterrence and falls in line with the historical view toward Western passive deterrence as “ridiculous”.

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This was written from the POV of someone in the space industry advocating a change to the space policy.