Although demonstrators still occupy the Maidan in central Kyiv and none of Ukraine’s fundamental issues that precipitated the crisis in late 2013 have been resolved, it is clear that the Russian “transfusion” of support for Ukrainian bonds and lower natural gas prices has given President Viktor Yanukovych’s government a respite. In this interval, it still is not fully clear what Ukraine’s obligations will be to Russia in return for this support. Nevertheless, one can observe the beginnings of the outline of what Ukraine now “owes” Russia. It should be remembered that as part of the Russian solution Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov stated that Russia devised a plan to restore “full-fledged” ties between Moscow and Kyiv (Interfax-Ukraine, December 7, 2013).
This does not include the question of Ukraine and the Russian-led Customs Union—indeed, Moscow seems hardly willing to admit an economic basket case the size of Ukraine into the union at present given the economic disaster it would portend and the political explosion that would surely erupt. But full-fledged ties clearly point to modifications, probably in Russia’s favor, in gas, defense issues and industry, as well as other economic sectors. Thus, Russia wrote into the agreement important clauses on the maintenance and re-equipment of the Black Sea Fleet and construction of a bridge over the Kerch Strait between Ukraine’s Crimea and Russia’s Krasnodar Krai (Vedomosti Online, December 19, 2013). What this means is that Russia is strengthening its hold on Crimea and adding infrastructure so that this region remains hostage to bilateral relations. And should Kyiv falter in its obligations or become sufficiently weak, Crimea will likely revert de jure to Russia—even though it is already de facto largely controlled by Russia.
Importantly, both sides differ in their opinion of Ukraine’s “assets.” President Yanukovych insists that his country’s gas transport system remains an important commodity, while Russian President Vladimir Putin said its value is approaching minimal levels (Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, December 20, 2013). This may be a tactic to drive down the price of Ukraine’s pipeline network. But it is unlikely that Moscow has given up its dream of acquiring that network even though it has begun work on the South Stream gas pipeline, which avoids Ukrainian territory entirely. The political payoff of controlling Ukraine is too large for the Kremlin to renounce; and second, too many Russian elites’ private interests are embroiled in Ukraine’s gas issues for anyone to walk away empty-handed.
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